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PROBLEMS  OF  INTERDEPENDENCE  IN  A MULTIPOLAR  WORLD  (*) 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  November  1978,  after a  period of  strong turbulence,  a  phase 
of  relatively smooth  exchange  rate developments  was  ushered  in by  the 
various  understandings  concluded  with  the  United  States authorities.  A 
month  later, with  the  launching  of  the  European  Monetary  System,  a  new 
framework  was  given  to  intra-European monetary  relations. 
In October  1979,  the  Federal  Reserve  announced  that it would 
henceforth  be  using  new  monetary  control  procedures.  Since  then the 
reliance  on  these  procedures  has  grown  stronger.  As  a  result,  United 
States  interest  rates  have  undergone  sharp fluctuations and 
have  imposed  a  similar variability on  an  apparently  rising trend of  the 
dollar:ECU  and  dollar:DM  rates. 
Last  May,  the  United  States Under-Secretary  for  Monetary  Affairs, 
Beryl  W.  Sprinkel,  publicly drew  the  conclusions  which  he  thought  ought 
to  follow  from  the  new  monetary  control  procedures  for  the  United  States 
international monetary  policy by  stating before  the Joint  Economic  Committee 
the  intent 
11to  return to the  more  limited pre-1978 concept  of  intervention". 
Both  Europe  and  Japan  are preoccupied  by  what  some  observers  consider  a 
radical  version of  the 
11benign  neglect
11  policy that  imposes,  de  facto,  free 
floating  interest or  exchange  rates  upon  Europe. 
This  conference  provides  an  excellent opportunity to detail the 
reactions of  a  European  to transatlantic monetary  events  of  the  spring of 
1981  and  to express  the  concerns  that  may  be  felt  in the  Community:  sharp 
fluctuations  in the dollar disturb trade  between  the  Community  and  the 
United  States, affect  the  price of oil and  other  primary  commodities, 
aggravate  tensions  within  the  EMS,  and  disrupt  the  coordination of  exchange 
and  intervention policies. 
Yet,  if  we  were  to focus  entirely on  today•s  events,  we  would 
not  do  justice to the  complexity and  to the  depth  of  our  monetary 
relations. 
Indeed,  this is not  the first  time  that  Europeans  have  voiced 
their dislike of  American  monetary  stances.  Did  we  not  suffer  from  the 
dollar  scarcity,  from  United  States  investments  in Europe  and  from  Ame-
rican seignorage?  Later  the  inflationary potential of  excess dollar 
balances  left  some  of  us  aghast  while  others  welcomed  the  United  States 
dollars  which  - at  long  last - enabled  them  to escape  the  balance of 
payments  financing  constraints.  How  often have  .. substitution accounts" 
been  discussed only to be  replaced  by  an  excessively strong dollar and 
inflationary oil prices? 
<*>  I  wish  to express  my  gratitude to  F.  Papadia,  L.  Schubert,  and 
F.  Woehrling  for  pretious assistance  in preparing this paper, 
and  to P.  Kenen  for  useful  comments.  Errors  and  opinions  are  mine. -2-
The  long  list of  European  complaints  suggests  that  we  should 
examine  the  United  States-European monetary  relations  from  a  broader 
perspective  in  terms  of  both  time  and  space.  Money  is an  instrument 
of  macro-economic  management.  We  cannot  therefore  simply  limit  our  in-
vestigations  to  interest  rates,  exchange  rates  and  to  monetary  policy, 
but  we  must  ask  ourselves  more  generally how  monetary  policies  have 
influenced trade  and  domestic  production.  Furthermore,  United  States-
European  relations  have  constituted the  core of the  International  Moneta-
ry  System  in  the  past  and,  together  with  Japan,  can  be  expected to  retain 
primary  responsibility  for  world  macro-economic  policy.  Such  a  discussion 
of  United  States-European  monetary  relations  thus  inevitably  leads  us  to 
investigate  how  - together  - they  have  managed  both  domestic  and  world 
monetary  affairs and  to  what  extent  their  conceptions  on  how  the  system 
works  have  been  adequate  and  compatible. 
2.  THE  EMERGENCE  OF  A TRIPOLAR  WORLD 
In  the  last  twenty  years  the  relative position of  the  United 
States  in  the  world  economy  has  profoundly  changed.  While  the  Community's 
Gross  Domestic  Product  was  about  half that  of  the  United  States  in' 1960, 
the  two  were  roughly  of  the  same  size  twenty  years  later  (Table  1).  During 
the  same  period,  Japan's  GDP  rose  from  some  10  per  cent  of the  United  States• · 
to  about  40  per  cent.  Owing  to  these  developments  the  United  States  in-
fluenced  Less  and  Less  the other  two  countries  through  mere  interplay of 
economic  flows. 
On  the other  hand,  the  United  States  has  become  more  open  to 
foreign  trade  and  services.  In  the  early sixties,  imports  of  these  goods 
and  services  accounted  for  only  4  per  cent  of  United  States  GDP:  in  the 
Late  seventies, this  figure  had  risen  to  some  8-10 per  cent.  Community 
imports  of  goods  and  services,  excluding  intra-Community  trade  and  ser-
vices,  were  about  11  per  cent  at  the  beginning  of  the  sixties and  14 
towards  the  end  of  the  seventies.  Finally,  the  "openness"  of  Japan  rose 
from  some  9  to  13  per  cent  of gross  domestic  product  over  the  same  period. 
The  figures  are  influenced to  some  extent  by  the  rise  in the price of 
oil  which  has  led  to  an  increase  in  the  degree  of  dependence  of  the 
developed  countries on  imports.  The  respective  shares  in  world  trade 
(excluding  intra-Community  trade)  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  Community 
have  remained  remarkably  stabte during  the  past  twenty  years,  hovering 
around  25  per  cent  for  the  Community  and  15  per  cent  for  the  United 
States.  However,  Japan's  share  rose  from  5  to 9  per  cent. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  seventies, overall  productivity as 
measured  by  per  capita  GDP  at  current  prices  and  exchange  rates,  reached 
roughly  the  same  level  in  the  three  areas:  it  stood  at  some  ECU  7,800 
in  the  United  States  as  against  6,700 for  the  European  Economic  Community 
and  6,400  for  Japan. -3-
When  we  come  to  financial  and  monetary  data  (Table  2),  the 
statistics become  more  difficult.Rough  indications  show  that,  in  spite 
of  considerable  changes  in  exchange  rate  relationships, the  dollar 
accounted  for  some  70  per  cent  of  the  euro-currency  markets  in  1980  as 
against  80  per  cent  at  the  beginning  of  the  decade  (Bank  of  International 
Settlements  data).  However,  throughout  the  seventies,  the  euro-currency 
market  has  grown  each  year  faster  than  the  domestic  monetary  aggregates 
and  much  faster  than  nominal  GOP,  so  that  the  quantitative  importance  of 
the  dollar  in  world  finance  has  increased  whilst  the  output  of  the 
United  States  has  diminished  relatively.  The  share  of  the  OM  in official 
reserves  has  risen  from  some  6  per  cent  in  1973  to  some  12  per  cent  in 
1979.  Comparable  figures  for  the  yen  are  0.5  per  cent  in  1973  and  4  per 
cent  in  1979.  The  share  of  the  dollar  fell  from  85  to  78  per  cent. 
What  do  these  figures  tell  us? 
First,  while  the  United  States economic  weight  has  decreased, 
its financial  importance  does  not  seem  to  have  diminished  much.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  economic  importance  of  the  Community  and  of  Japan has 
increased  considerably,  but  this  has  not  been  paralleled  in  the  finan-
cial  and  monetary  field.  These  developments  are  related to  the diffi-
culties encountered  in managing  world  macro-economies  as  there  is no 
dominant  power  as  in  the fifties,  while  the  United  States  nevertheless 
still seem  to  hold  a  preponderant  position. 
Second,  world  economic  integration  has  continued to ~ake progress 
and  has  even  accelerated.  Cyclical  and  policy  interdependence  is  high. 
The  third conclusion  concerns  the gradually  emerging 
European  pole.  This  pole  is  obviously  much  less  coherent  than  the  other  two: 
its foreign  trade  and  GOP  aggregates  reflect  to  some  extent  only  sta-
tistical magnitudes.  However,  the  relative decline  of  the  United  States 
economic  power  and  especially the  exchange  rate  regime  that  has  pre-
vailed  since  1973  has  brought  about  a  degree  of  individualization of  the 
Community  in  the  field of  macro-economic  policy that  did  not  previously 
exist. 
The  evolution  which  led  to  the  present  floating  regime  and  floating 
itself  have  "deprived"  individual  European  countries of  the  organizing 
factor  represented  by  the  dollar.  After  a  long  period of  increasing di-
vergences  and  of  a  lack  of  any  form  of  monetary  organization,  the  co-
ordination of  monetary  and  exchange  policies  has  been  strengthened  by  the 
implementation  of  the  European  Monetary  System  which  has  thus  resulted 
in  an  increasingly more  orderly  joint float  against  the  dollar  and  the 
yen.  This  tends  to  individualize  the  third pole  without  it  being  possible 
to  determine  its nature  exactly:  for  example  whether  it  could  be  considered 
a  OM  zone,  given  the  important  role  of  Germany,  or  whether  it  could  be 
seen ·as  an  ECU  zone  in  which  policy  coordination  is predominant.  The  third 
pole  manifestly  lacks  a  widely  held  international  currency. -4-
3.  INTERDEPENDENCE  AND  FLOATING 
Without  taking any  side  in the debate  on  exchange  rates  regimes, 
I  shall try to draw  from  the  experience  of  the  last  years  to emphasize 
some  of  the  problems  that  may  arise  in an  interdependent,  multipolar 
world  in which  there is no  agreed  exchange  rate  rule. 
The  proponents  of  floating  were  not  only aiming  at  improving  the 
technical  working  of  the  then existing system  by  making  exchange  rate 
changes  more.timely,  by  bringing about  a  more  adequate  exchange  rate 
structure,  or  by  introducing a  greater degree  of  exchange  rate or  interest 
rate variability to take  account  of  larger  capital mobility.  They  were 
also advocating greater  independence  for  national policies.  It was  claimed 
that  exchange  rate flexibility was  a  way  to  comply  with  what  could  be 
called the .,interdependence  constraint  ... 
On  the other  hand,  floating  rates  have  also brought  new  problems, 
that  were  not  all expected  by  their proponents,  such  as  J  curve  effects 
and  destabilizing capital  flows.  Such  problems  have  placed  new  and  un• 
expected  constraints on  the  elaboration of  national  policies. 
I  shall  single out  three  types  of  problems  that  emerge  when 
governments,  encouraged  by  floating,  follow  non-coordinated policies 
and,  to a  great  extent, 
11let the  rate find  its own  level...  Ranked  by 
decreasing time  dimension  they are  the  structural  and  allocation problems 
posed  in the  long  run,  the effects of  cyclical divergences  on  exchange 
rates and  trade,  and  the  dominance  of  monetary  policy in the  short  run. 
I  will  now  turn to them  drawing  examples  respectively from  Europe,  Japan, 
and  the  United  States.  I  shall not,  indeed,  deal  with  exchange  rate 
variability on  a  day  to day  basis as  it seems  to  me  that,  within  limits, 
it serves a  useful  role  in  inciting portfolio managers  to prudence. 
4.  STRUCTURAL  AND  ALLOCATION  PROBLEMS 
Exchange  rates are most  often discussed  within a  short  term 
horizon  extending at  most  over  a  cycle.  But  there is also a  very 
different  type  of  long  term  exchange  rate problem,  which  has  not  been 
discussed much,  nor  its structural  impact  on  industry and  on  resource 
allocation fully assessed. -5-
In  the early seventies it was  widely  held  that a  country  could 
support  expansionary policies by  a  depreciating  exchange  rate.  It was 
thought  that,  despite high  inflation,  such  a  country could  not  only 
sustain its exports and  hence  its employment  through  devaluationsp  but 
it could  also  improve  its industrial structure as  the profits earned 
in the  export  sector  would  lead  to  investment. 
To  some  extent,  Italy and  the United  Kingdom,  at  least  up  to 
1978,  followed  such  a  policy,  by  compensating  domestic  and 
imported  inflation by  an  even  faster declining  effective exchange  rate; 
the  real  exchange  rate depreciated sharply.  This  resulted  in typical 
"open  scissor"  type  graphs,  such  as  those presented  in  Chart  II. 
For  various  reasons,  however,  the experience of the seventies 
has  not  supported such  views  with  as  much  success  as  it had  been  predicted. 
Firstly,  industrialists are  well  aware  of  the  temporary  nature  of  the 
depreciation of  the  real  exchange  rate achieved  when  inflation rates 
are  high.  They  refrain therefore  from  investing their profits as 
much  as  hoped.  Secondly,  the depreciating  real exchange  rate grants, 
though  only  temporarily,  a  new  lease of  life to otherwise obsolescent 
industries;  furthermore,  if investments  are being  undertaken,  they 
may  be  misallocated to  industries that will  turn out  to  be  non-
competitive once  the exchange  rate has  returned to a  more  normal  level. 
In  any  event,  investments  in  industries whose  profitability is mainly 
ensured  by  devaluation  do  not  contribute much  to  the  rejuvenation of a 
domestic industry.  Thirdly,  since domestic  consumption  is not  cut  back 
sufficiently  by  such  a  policy,  there  is  little room  for  exports  and 
investments.  Finally, when  inflation becomes  unbearable  and  must  be 
reversed,  a  "stabilization crisis overshooting"  occurs and  false  signals 
are once  more  given  to the markets,  though  in the opposite direction 
(see  Chart  II- United  Kingdom). 
In  the opposite  sense,  continuously appreciating  real  rates, 
which  were  celebrated a  few  years ago  as  the driving  force  behind vir-
tuous  circles also may  give  rise to problems.  Such  a  case  is well  illu-
strated by  Germany  :  here  the "open  scissor" graph  in  Chart  II  is the 
inverse of the  Italian case.  The  real  exchange  rate of the  OM  appre-
ciated strongly between  1968  and  1972  in  response  to the  realization 
that  the dollar was  overvalued and  the the  OM  was  undervalued.  In 
1973-76  the German  stabilization effort  led to a  further  appreciation. 
After another  bump  the  real  rate of the  OM  fell back,  in 1981,  to  the 
1970  level,  i.e.  to a  level  that  used  to  be  considered undervalued. -6-
The  appreciation of the  OM,  fuelled  by  capital movements  that 
were  related to the emerging  role of the  OM  as  an  "international 
currency", was  welcomed  because of  its stabilizing effects on  the price 
level,  especially after the first oil shock.  And  for  some  time,  Germany 
seemed  to enjoy  the best of all worlds  as  protracted  J  curves, moderniz-
ation  and  productivity increases  in the export  sector prevented the 
balance of payments  from  being  hard  hit  by  the appreciation of the 
currency.  However,  new  foreign  products gradually penetrated the 
German  markets  and  finally  the export  sector also "adjusted".  Once 
these  long  run  phenomena  began  to make  their  influences felt,  in combi-
nation with  those  of  the oil shock  and  cyclical  factors,  it became 
apparent  that  the  OM  had  been  overvalued.  It is  important  to note that 
such  structural effects of an  overvaluation appear  with  a  lag  that  is 
measurable  in a  number  of  years  rather than  in  the space of,  say, 
twelve  months. 
These  Long  term  or  structural overshootings  in  real  exchange  rates  are 
particularly  important  in  a  tripolar  world  because  economies  in  such  a 
world,  being  very  large  and  having  a  relatively small  open  sector,  can 
maintain disequilibria  for  a  Long  time  before  they  become  apparent. 
"Macro-dumping"  is therefore  a  real  threat  to  a  tripolar  world,  because 
the  country's  expansionary  monetary  policy,  via  asset  market  phenomena, 
can  "temporarily"  depress  the  real  exchange  rate below  a  "Long  run  equili-
brium"  rate. 
Real  exchange  rate movements  of  the dollar and  the yen,  as  illu-
strated in  Chart  II, provide other examples  of  such  problems. 
In  the  United  States, the combined  effect of  changes  in the effec-
tive  exchange  rate and  relative  price performance  has  resulted  in  movements  in 
the "real" exchange  rate which  may  be  regarded as  a  measure  of price and 
cost  competitivity.  After a  rapid  improvement  between  1950  and  1952, 
the United  States entered a  decade  of stability in the real  exchange  rate. 
After 1962,  economic  activity expanded  and  productivity rose,  but  infla-
tion  remained  subdued  and  United  States "competitivity"  increased until 
1967.  Between  1967  and  1971,  inflation  rose  and  bottlenecks appeared. 
With  a  stable effective exchange  rate,  competitiveness declined.  The  fall 
of the  real  exchange  rate between  1971  and  1974  resulted  from  the combi-
. nation  of  the depreciation of the dollar and  relatively  low  inflation rates. -7-
The  current  account  developments  of  the  United  States do  not 
support  the  conclusions  that  could  be  drawn .from  a  superficial  reading 
of  these  indices.  Massive  surpluses  were  recorded  during  the fifties, 
when  the  United  States still enjoyed  a  considerable technological  lead, 
but  they  shrunk  during  the sixties,  in part  because  of  the  high  level 
of domestic  demand.  In  the  seventies  large deficits appeared,  essentially 
for  two  reasons.  On  the ·one  hand,  notwithstanding a  strong  lead  in 
highly advanced  technology,  many  United  States products  were  not  compet-
itive on  world  markets  (big automobiles  are one  symbol>.  On  the other 
hand,  the  United  States  began  to  import  many  consumer  goods  with  high 
income  elasticity, and  became  dependent  on  imported  oil. Thus,  for  a 
long  time,  the  decline  in the  United  States  real  exchange  rate  was 
insufficient to  compensate  for  the  structural  factors  which  led  it to 
become  progressively  less  competitive. 
5.  CYCLICAL  DIVERGENCES 
Cyclical  movements  have  continued  to distinguish  economic 
activity in  the  seventies  and  have  led  to a  type of  exchange  rate over-
shooting  which  can  be  contrasted  with  the  performance  of  an  exchange 
rate  system  in  which  both  national  and  international authorities  take 
a  stronger view  on  the  exchange  rate. 
In  a  regime  under  which  governments  take a  longer  term  view 
of  their exchange  rates  and  act  consistently with  that  view  through 
intervention or other  instruments,  the  balance  of  payments  adjustment 
mechanism  exercises  self-correcting influences  and  the  government  is  led, 
in due  time,to  conduct  its policy  in a  way  more  favourable  to  international 
equilibrium.  When  the  rate  is  left to float,  the  signals that  can  be 
derived  from  the  foreign  sector  may  be  alarmist  and  typical  overshooting 
spirals  can  be  observed:  the  current  account  imbalance  is worsened  by 
J  curve,  or  inverted  J  curve, effects.  The  current  account  performance 
then  unleashes  capital  flows  that  bring  the  exchange  rate further  away 
from  what  would  be  a  more  adequate  level.  Eventually,  very  strong policy 
measures  must  be  adopted  to  reverse  the  situation.  These  measures  may 
be  at  the origin of  exagge~ted movements  in  the opposite direction. 
There  are  many  examples  of  such  cyclical  problems,  and  I  shall 
illustrate the  case of  Japan  since  the  movements  of  the  yen  are  both 
recent  and  of  great  trading  interest to us.  Between  1976  and  1981  we 
have  witnessed  formidable  swings  in  the  value  of  the yen  - in both 
effective and  real  terms  - that  can  hardly  be  justified in  terms  of 
either  long  run  compefiti»eness or  relative inflation rates and  which, 
although  not  exclusively of  a  cyclical nature,  may  usefully serve  to 
illustrate the point.  We  must  first  remember  that, until very  recently, 
Japan  has  maintained  strong  capital  controls  so  that  the exchange  rate 
was  mostly  influenced  by  the  current  account  and  some  short  term  capital 
movements.  In  1978,  the  Japanese authorities  were  forced  to  let their rate 
appreciate and  took  further  expansionary measures,  in  response  to the  Bonn -8-
Summit.  Shortly before the second  oil shock  unfolded,  the yen  had  already 
begun  to fall  This  decline was  accelerated by  the effects of  the oil shock; 
at  the  same  time,  the authorities adopted  severely  restrictive fiscal poli-
cies but  maintained  low  interest  rates.  These  measures  were  strongly 
supportive  of  exports,  which  rose  considerably. 
Japan's position was  obviously difficult, because  of  its extreme 
dependence  on  oil and  also  because  of the highly  expansionary cyclical 
position  in which  it  found  itself and  for  which  it was  only partially 
responsible.  It was  therefore  inherently difficult  to determine an  ade-
quate  new  exchange  rate,  especially under  conditions of genuine  uncertainty. 
Yet,  the  floating  exchange  rate  system  appears  to  have  increased 
rather  than  reduced  this uncertainty.  Firstly,  important  J  curve  effects 
considerably magnified  the  swing  in  the  exchange  rate.  Secondly,  the 
absence  of a  strong  view  of the  rate  by  the government,  its foreign part-
ners and  by  international authorities,  increased market  uncertainty. 
Thirdly,  floating  and  controls  helped  the Government  to maintain artifi-
cially depressed  interest  rates;  the huge  foreign  exchange  intervention 
of the  Bank  of  Japan  had  thus  reduced  effects.  In  a  system  of  jointly 
managed  rates,  the question of the "rate to hold"  would  have  come  up, 
monetary  policy would  have  had  to tighten  interest rates, and  interven-
tions,  if necessary  supported by  official borrowing,  might  have  been  more 
substantial. 
There  are consequences  that  cannot,  in  the  real  world,  be  disso-
ciated from  the enormous  swings  in  the  yen  :  the  low  level of the yen  in 
1979  and  in  early 1980  has  contributed to  foster  Japanese market  penetra-
tion  in  Europe  to a  degree  that  is perhaps  not  warranted by  longer  term 
trends  in Japanese price and  cost competitivity and  has  nurtured protec-
tionist feelings and  reactions.  This  large  swing  has  thus  exerted  lasting 
real  effects that  would  have  been  avoided  if the Japanese government  and 
the  international  community  had  taken a  different  view  of the yen  and  of 
policy co-ordination. 
This  example  illustrates the problems  that  emerge  from  the pur-
suit of  "an  independent  policy course  in an  interdependent  world".  The 
rapid correction of  the  imbalance  in  Japan's  current  account  - desirable 
as  it may  be  from  this nation's  individual  standpoint - was  only  a  tempo-
rary benefit  because  it gave  rise to  far-reaching  secondary  reactions of 
a  protectionist nature. -9-
6.  MONETARY  POLICY:  TODAY'S  DEVELOPMENTS 
The  third type  of  problem  is illustrated best  by  the  events of 
the  last  weeks  and  months  and  relates to  the  question  raised by  the  recent 
course  of  monetary  policy  in  the  United  States. 
As  is  shown  in  chart  III,  in  the  two  years  since  the  start of  the 
European  Monetary  System. there  have  been· substantial  fluctuations of  the 
dollar  against  Community  currencies.  During  the first  few  months  of  the 
European  Monetary  System  the  dollar  was  on  a  rising  tren~but this  was 
soon  reversed  and  in  the  second  half of  1979  the dollar fell  sharply,  by 
over  5  per  cent  against  the  ECU.  In  1980  the  increased volatility of 
United  States'  interest  rates - associated with  the  change  in  the  tech-
niques  of  monetary  control  initiated the previous  October  - gave  rise to 
ffiore  pronounced  fluctuations  in  the dollar.  In  the  first  qua~ter of  1980 
the  dollar  rose  by  10.4 per  cent  against  the  ECU,  but  then  fell  sharply 
by  9  per  cent  in  the  second  quarter.  In  the  second  half of  1980  through 
to mid-February  1981  the  dollar  rose  once  more,  appreciating  by  nearly 
24  per  cent  against  the  ECU.  Subsequently  and  as  a  result  of  further 
interest  rate  increases  in  Europe,  the  dollar fell  by  4.4 per  cent  to the 
end  of  March.  We  have  all  witnessed  the  latest  resurgence  of  the dollar 
which  has  risen  by  about  10  per  cent  in  the  two  months  between  end  March  and 
end  May,  in  tandem  with  yet  another  upward  swing  in  United  States  interest 
rates. 
A similar degree  of volatility can  be  observed  in  United  States 
and  European  nominal  and  real  interest  rates.  The  extreme  volatility of 
United  States  nominal  interest  rates  in the  period  from  the  end  of  1979 
until  now  is  well-known  and  is  illustrated in  chart  III.  The  effect on 
European  interest  rates  is  also  shown  in that  chart  where  it can  be  seen 
that  European  countries  have  been  forced  somewhat  to  follow  the  American 
developments,  although  attempting  to  dampen  them  down  as  much  as possible. 
What  is  less  widely  realized  is that  real  interest  rates  have  fluctuated 
widely  as  well.  In  the  United  States~art V)  ex-post  real  interest 
rates  have  climbed  from  broadly  zero  at  the  beginning  of  1979  to  a  peak 
of  about  4  per  cent  by  the  end  of  1980  and  well  in excess of  5  per  cent 
more  recently.  In  Germany,  taken  as  a  representative  European  country, 
the  ex-ante  real  rate of  interest  has  recently  reached  record  levels. 
It is  hard  to  reconcile  such  volatility of  real  interest  rates  with 
any  clear  policy objective. 
These  sharp  fluctuations  in  the dollar  are  a  cause  of  concern  to 
the  Community;  firstly because  of  the direct  - albeit  lagged- effects on 
trade  betweenthe Community  and  the  United  States  and  of  U.S.  competition 
with  the  Community  in  external  markets;  secondly  because  of  the possible 
effects of  dollar  fluctuations  on the prices and  cost  of  primary  products, 
particularly oil;  and  thirdly because  sharp  external  currency  movements 
can  aggravate  tensions  within  the  European  Monetary  System  and  disturb 
coordination  of  exchange  rates  and  intervention policies. -IO-
The  influence  of  fluctuations  in the  dollar:OM  exchange  rate 
on  the  relative position of  currencies  within  the  European  Monetary 
System  band  can  be  seen  in  chart  IV.  When  the  mark  has  been  strong 
against  the dollar it has  often  been  strong against  other  European 
Monetary  System  currencies and  when  it has  been  weak  against  the  dollar 
it has  been  weak  within  the  European  Monetary  System  band.  This  is 
due to the  fact  that  the  OM  is a  closer  substitute of  the dollar  than 
other  Community  currencies,  and,  therefore,  any  "flight" from  the 
dollar  is accompanied  by  a  movement  into the  OM  and  vice-versa.  Of 
course,  only  a  part of  European  Monetary  System  tensions  are  due  to 
this dollar:OM  relationship and  I  am  personally convinced  that  the 
Lack  of  a  "dollar policy"  is too often  blamed  for  difficulties and 
tensions  that  are  due  to our  making.  This  does  not  reduce,  however, 
the  relevance  of  the  phenomenon. 
In  a  situation of  very  high  financial  interdependence,  the 
ups  and  downs  in the  United  States  interest and  exchange  rates  confront 
the  European  Community  with  difficult  choices.  It  could  eliminate 
exchange  rate volatility vis-a-vis the dollar  by  pegging its interest 
rates to United  States  interest  rates.  In this case  the  Community 
would  be  guided  by  a  variable  the  movements  of  which  are explicitly 
disregarded as  meaningless  by  the  very  authorities  who  determine  them. 
Moreover,  both  European  interest  rates  and  money  supply  would  be 
determined  by  short  run  domestic  developments  in the  United  States 
and  by  the  personalities and  institutions of  that  country.  Alterna-
tively, the  Community  could  itself adopt  the  United  States  procedures 
of  giving absolute priority to quantity-oriented monetary  control; 
exchange  rate volatility could  then  be  compounded.  Imagine  the  extreme 
case  in which  all major  countries adopted  United  States  procedures: 
in these  periods  when  short  term  economic  fluctuations  failed to offset 
one  another,  there  would  be  extreme  exchange  rate volatility.  It seems 
highly unlikely that  private speculators  would  even  it out.  Thus  we 
seem  to  be  Left  with  no  other  choice  than  the  one  we  are  making  in 
practice,  and  that  consists of  a  mixture  of  devaluation and  restrictive 
policies, of passivity,  solidarity and  expressions  of  concern. -II-
From  the  abandonment  of  simple  rules  for  international  monetary 
coordination,  such  as  fixed  or  freely  floating  exchange  rates, one 
should  certainly not  draw  the  negative  conclusion that  coordination  is 
unnecessary  or  automatically  assured  by  ensuring  "domestic  order".  Inter-
dependence  is still there  and  would  require  appropriate  action  even  among 
perfectly stable  and  well-managed  economies,  as  long  as  economic  policies 
are  actively  conducted  in  each  of  them.  Instead of that  negative  Gon-
clusion,  two  positive  conclusions  have  to  be  drawn  from  the  existing 
state of  monetary  relationships. 
Firstly, that  a  much  wider  range  of policies, objectives,  instru-
ments,etc.  have  to  be  discussed  in  the  fora  where  officials discuss  prob-
Lems  stemming  from  interdependence.  An  exchange  rate  rule  was  a  simple 
way,  perhaps  too  simple  for  our  complex  world,  to  summarize  the  Links 
between  partners.  Today  we  have  to  engage  on  themuch  more  complicated 
and  politically delicate  exercise  of  discussing  and  comparing  our  policies 
in  all their  aspects  including  some  which  have  a  Less  evident  relation-
ship-with  the  external  sector,  like  the  techniques  adopted  for  monetary 
control. 
Secondly,  to  the  extent  to  which  the  recognition of  interdepen-
dence  involves  not  only  an  exchange  of  information  but  also  leads  to 
action or  to  changes  that  are,  in  substance,  acts of  international 
policy,  then  this  is  closer  to  the  "discretionary pole"  of  the  rule  vs. 
discretion  spectrum  than  it  would  be  under  the  simple,  objective  regime 
of  an  exchange  rate  rule. 
For  both  these  reasons,  international policy  coordination  has 
become  more  difficult,  not  Less  necessary,  than inthepast  and  it re-
quires  that  we  go  rather  deeply  into each  others "internal  affairs". -12-
7.  U.S.  MONETARY  POLICY  AS  SEEN  FROM  EUROPE  :  A)  OBJECTIVES 
To  do  so,  I  shall  offer  a  commented  text-book  description of 
the  United  States  monetary  policy after October  1979,  when  the  Fed 
changed  its operating  procedure,  to  see  at  what  level  a  European  ob-
server  may  have  disagreements  with  his  transatlantic  friends. 
The  first  aspect  of  the  new  American  monetary  policy  is the 
increased  weight  attributed to  the  final  objective of  restraining  in-
flation. 
One  must  always  be  wary  of  dubbing  policy declarations  as  his-
torical  events  and  I  could  not  accept  that  the  October  1979  measures 
signal  the  final  burial  of  Keynesian  monetary  policy.  The  great  English 
economist  has  been  buried  so  many  times  already  in  the  last  few  years 
that  it  reminds  me  of  the  phrase  that  Italo Svevo  attributed to one  of 
his  characters:  "to  stop  smoking  is  very  easy,  I  have  already  done  it 
several  times  ••• ".  However,  even  without  proclaiming  that  a  new  monetu 
·ary  era  has  begun  in  October  1979,  I  think  it  is safe to  say  that  a 
shift  of  emphasis  took  place  on  that  date  and  that  short-term  support 
of  economic  activity  lost  weight,  in  favour  of price stability,  in  the 
complex  of objectives pursued  by  means  of  monetary  policy. 
There  is  Little to disagree  with  this  change  of emphasis.  I 
think  it  is  now  accepted  by  economists  of  all  "schools"  that  money  is, 
so  to  speak,  an  input  to  the  production,  investment  and  consumption 
process  and  that  its efficiency as  an  input  depends  on  its stability. 
This  means  that  inflation  hampers  growth  in  a  basic,  structural  sense 
and  that  the  short  term  benefits  to  be  obtained  by  pumping  money  into 
the  economy  are  not  worth  the  long  term  costs of  inflation.  Indeed, 
some  European  countries,  Germany  and  the  Benelux  countries  in  the  EEC 
Switzerland and  Austria  outside  itp  understood this very  early and  their 
relative success  is one  important  reason  why  other  countries are  no~ 
more  convinced  in their opposition to  inflation. 
Not  having  found  anything  to disagree  within  the  final  objective 
of  United  States monetary  policy,  let's consider  the  so-called inter-
mediate  target  variables. 
These  are  expressed  in  the  United  States as  rates of  increase 
in  the  monetary  aggregates  which  are  set  normally  for  the period from 
the  last  quarter  of  the present  year  to  the  last  quarter  of  the  year 
ahead.  Target  ranges  are  set  for  narrow  and  wider  definitions of  the 
money  supply.  The  actual  numbers  for  the  lower  and  upper  range  for  each 
aggregate  are  rates of  increase  thought  compatible  with,  and  necessary 
for,  the  achievement-of  the  final  targets. -13-
The  philosophy  behind  the  fixing  of these targets has  been  expres-
sed  at  the highest  level  by  the  Chairman  of  the Board  of Governors  of the 
Federal  Reserve  before  the  Senate  Banking  Committee  :  "Our  intent  is not 
to accommodate  inflationary forces;  rather  we  mean  to exert  continuing 
restraint  on  growth  in  money  and  credit to  squeeze out  inflationary pres-
sures.  That  posture  should  be  reflected  in further  deceleration  in  the 
monetary  aggregates  in  the  years ahead,  and  is an  essential  ingredient 
in any  effective policy to  restore price stability".  However  he  added: 
"I  know  that  the case  is sometimes  made  that monetary  policy can  alone 
deal  with  the  inflation side of  the equation.  But  not  in  the  real  world  -
not  if other policies pull  in other directions,  feeding  inflationary 
expectations, propelling  the cost  and  wage  structure upwards,  and  placing 
enormous  burdens  on  financial  markets  with  large budgetary deficits into 
the  indefinite future". 
Another  prominent  member  of  the  FederaL  Open  Market  Committee, 
Anthony  Solomon,  has  put  it  in  these  terms  :  "Gradual  reduction of money 
and  credit growth  as  the centrepiece of broad monetary  strategy has  indeed 
almost  ceased  to  be  a  matter  of  controversy.  In  a  period of  prolonged 
and  substantial  inflation,  virtually all schools of  economic  thought  can 
accept  such  an  approach  and  I  certainly do  myself.  But  I  would  like to 
suggest  that  it would  be  a  mistake  to assume  that  slowing  monetary  growth 
by  itself offers a  simple or painless, purely "technical",  solution to 
our  inflation problem •••••  On  the whole,  the  experience abroad  tends  to 
confirm  the  suspicion  that  slowing  monetary  growth  by  itself may  not  be 
enough  to control  price  inflation  within acceptable periods of  time  and 
without  unacceptable  side effects.  A good  record  on  achieving  money 
growth  targets  has  not  necessarily ensured a  good  performance  on  the 
inflation front  - and  conversely.  Over  periods of  up  to three or  four 
years,  there  seems  to  be  at  best only  a  rather  loose  relationship between 
the growth  of the aggregates  and  price inflation.  Over  longer  periods, 
to'be sure,  the  relationship  is closer". 
8.  B)  TECHNIQUES 
Looking  for  disagreements  between  Europe  and  the  United  States we 
have  therefore  to go  further  through  our  textbook  description and  examine 
the  so-called operating  target. 
Under  the pre-October  1979  method,  the Trading  Desk  in  New  York 
operated to peg  the  Federal  Fund's  rate,  i.e.  the  interest  rate charged by 
banks  with  excess  reserves  for  lending  them  to  banks  in  need  to  bring 
their balances  with  the  Federal  Reserve  bank  up  to  the  required  level. 
The  drawback  of adopting  a  level of  interest  rates as a  short-term operat-
ing  target  was  that,in order  to  keep  this  rate within its tolerance  range, 
the manager  of  the open  market  desk  had  to  supply  any  amount  of  reserves -14-
that  was  demanded  by  the  banks  at that  level  of  the  Federal 
Funds  rate.  Whenever  the  money  supply  was  rising strongly, 
banks'  demand  for  Federal  Funds  increased  equallY  and  open  market  pur-
chases  had  to  be  stepped  up  to prevent  the  Federal  Funds  rate  from  moving 
outside its tolerance  range.  In  addition,  there  was  some  reluctance by 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board  to adjust,at  its monthly  meetings,the tolerance 
range  speedily and  by  sufficient amounts  to correct  deviations  in  the 
money  supply  from  its target path,  partly because  it was  not  always  clear 
if the deviations·in the money  supply  figures  were  only  temporary  aberr~­
ions  likely to  reverse  themselves,  or  on  the contrary more  fundamental 
changes  in trends,  partly because  the  interest  rate was  regarded as  a 
politically sensitive  indicator.  Consequently,  frequent  short-term 
deviations  in  the money  supply  led  to an  erosion  of  public  confidence 
in the  willingness  or  the  ability of  the  Federal  Reserve  to stick to its 
own  targets. 
The  new  operating  target adopted  on  6  October  1979  is the amount 
of unborrowed  reserves  supplied to  the banking  system  through  open  market 
transactions.  There  is still a  tolerance  range  for  the  upper  and  lower 
level of the  Federal  Funds  rate,  but  this  range  is  now  so  wide  (e.g. 
from  8.5  to 14  percent  in  June  1980)  that  the  rate is  largely  left  to 
find  its own  level.  Thus,  in order  to gain control  over  reserves supplied 
to the  banking  system,  the  Federal  Reserve  has  more  or  less abandoned 
discretionary control  over  the  level of interest  rates. 
The  Federal  Reserve  is  careful to point out  that  there  is nothing 
sacred  in  the  new  rule  and  it is supposed  to  be  applied  "cum  grana salis". 
In  front  of the  Senate  Committee,  Chairman  Volcker  emphasized  "that  swings 
in  the money  and  credit aggregates  over  a  month,  a  quarter or even  longer 
should  not  be  disturbing,  provided  there  is understanding  and  confidence 
in our  intentions over  more  significant periods of time".  Anthony  Solomon 
goes  as  far  as  commenting  that  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  had  exagger-
ated  in  pursuing  monetary  targets during  the  second  quarter of 1980,  caus-
ing  unnecessary downswings  of the  interest  rates. 
Even  with  these qualifications,  however,  there  is a  diffe-
rence of  emphasis  between  Europeans  and  Americans  on  the  importance  to  be 
given  to money  aggregates  and  interest  rates  in conducting  monetary  policy. 
I  say  "between  Europeans  and  Americans"  because  this is both  the subject 
of today's  seminar  and,  I  would  say,  the geographical distinction of the 
arguments  in  the  Spring 1981.  It is necessaryp  however  not  to  forget  the 
existence of  all those  who  take  a  radical  "quantity" view  on  this side of 
the  Atlantic  as  well  as  those  who  continue  to advocate  a  more  price-oriented 
approach  in the  United  States. 
The  first  reason  which  would  justify paying  greater attention to 
interest  rates is somewhat  pedestrian but,  in  my  view,  important.  That  is 
that  while  everybody  knows  what  an  interest  rate is, the price they 
pay  (receive)  to  porrow  (lend)  money,  the  issue of what  is money  is 
much  more  complicated,  both  conceptually and  statistically.  A casual  look 
at  the  several  definitions of money  in a  given  economy  (not  to  speak  of 
inter-country differences)  is enough  to  prove  this statement.  Some  recent 
difficulties created by  the development  of  new  financial assets, especially -15-
in the  United  States  (NOW  accounts>,  or  the  peculiar effects  created 
by  the  lifting of  quantitative controls  (the "corset")  in the  United 
Kingdom,  just  make  this eternal  problem  worse.  A small  sign of this 
difficulty is the  fact  that  Paul  Volcker,  in front  of  a  Senate  Com-
mittee,  had  to  spend  something  like three  of  his total  eleven pages 
just to show  how  M1A  and  M1B  figures  were  altered by  the  growth  of 
NOW  accounts.  Close  to this  reason  is the  fact  th~t interest  rates 
are  observed  continuously without  delay. 
A second  reason  is that  interest  rates are,  so  to  speak,  a 
universal  variable while  monetary  aggregates  are  much  more  segmented. 
A change  in the  rate affects all mark~ participants,  having  widespread 
consequences  in terms  of  relative costs,  resource allocation,  and 
economic  behaviour.  This  is  not  so  for  a  temporary  deviation of  a 
monetary  aggregate  from  the  chosen  path.  If a  few  billion of  whatever 
M you  like are  lying  womewhere  in the  economy  for  some  time  nothing 
happens,  nobody's  behaviour  is  really affected.  To  seek  control  of 
the  aggregates  instant  by  instant, dollar  by  dollar  would  be  to 
ignore  realities and  to produce  more  shocks  and  uncertainties that it 
eliminates. 
If demand  curves  were  stable and  known,  there  would  be  a  known 
one-to-one  correspondence  between  price and  quantity and  it would  make 
no  difference  which  of  the  axes  one  looks  at.  As  they are  not,  we  do 
not  exactly  know  what  price  corresponds  to  what  quantity and  hence  we 
have  to  choose  what  to control.  If one  believes that  in the  long-run  the 
demand  for  money  is rather stable,  one  would  tend  to avoid  huge  swings 
in interest  rates also as  part  of  a  well-balanced "aggregate-oriented" 
monetary  policy.  A look  at "real" interest  rates  may  be  a  useful 
guidance  to  those  who  think  that  prices affect  economic  behaviour. -16-
9.  C)  EXCHANGE  RATES 
A last  issue  is the policy of  foreign  exchange  market  interventions. 
I  think  that  in this domain  the differences between  "American  and 
Europeans"  are  more  than  just a  matter  of emphasis. 
The  Under-Secretary  in the Treasury,  Mr.  B.  Sprinkel,  has  officially 
declared that  the  United  States " •••  intend to  return to the  more  limited 
pre-1978  concept  of  interventions  by  intervening only  when  necessary  to  coun-
ter conditions of disorder  in the market".  In  November  1978,  as  it will  be 
remembered,  after a  dramatic  run-down  on  the dollar,  the  Carter  administration 
had  announced  the  commitment  to a  more  active  intervention policy.  The  new 
policy is, therefore,  a  return to  the status quo  ante. 
For  several  reasons,  the position  in  Europe  is, in this respect, 
traditionally different  from  the one  described  by  Under-Secretary  B.  Sprinkel 
A first  reason,  peculiar  to  Europe,  is that,  as  I  have  shown  above, 
Europe  is much  more  open  to  international  trade than the  United  States. 
As  a  consequence  of that, an  "eye"  on  the  exchange  rate  is an  "eye"  (possibly 
a  very  sharp  one)  on  that  domestic  economy;  avoiding  excessive depreciations 
means  subduing  inflationary tensions. 
There  are,  however,  also  more  general  reasons.  Some  are  the  same, 
mutatis  mutandis,  as  those  mentioned  above  as  regards  the  relative weight 
of  interest  rates  and  money  aggregates  in  conducting  monetary  policy.  The 
fact  that  you  have  to give  a  certain quantity of,  say,  DMs  to  have  one  dollar 
is much  more  "solid" thant  the  fact  that  a  money  aggregate  has  grown  by  X 
percent  in a  given period.  -
There  is,finally, a  somewhat  more  philosophical  argument  involved. 
Under-Secretary  Sprinkel  made  it clear that the  new  administration does  not 
favour  interventions  because  :  "Significant  and  frequent  interventions  by 
governments  assume  that  a  relatively  few  officials  know  better where  ex-
change  rates  should  <or  should  not)  be  than  a  large  number  of decisions-
makers  in the  market,  and  that  public  funds  should  be  put  at  risk on  the 
basis of that  assumption". 
It  is clear that  the  (price)  result of  a  competitive market  is a 
very  weighty  variable,  being,  indeed,  the  end  result of a  very  large  num-
ber  of transactions.  This  does  not  imply,  however,  that one  cannot  have -17-
one 0s  own  idea  on  the "right" price and  bet  on  it.  Indeed  operators  do 
this all the  time  (*). 
But  if we  admit  that  anyone  can  make  his own  idea  about  the  lpprop-
r.iat·eness  of  the  "market  price"  without  being  accused  of "lese-majeste", 
why  should  we  just exclude  from  the  game  the arm  of  collective  judgment 
(is not  the government  just this?).  To  admit  that  the game  is tough  and 
competition stiff does  not  mean  that  one  should  not  even  enter  the  ring. 
In  addition,  intervention  may  be  needed  to avoid disruptions  to 
trade and  inconsistency with  fundamental  economic  factors.  Quite apart 
from  cases of erratic movements  due  to disorderly market  conditions, cir-
cumstances  may  arise where  intervention designed  to  dampen  exchange  rate 
variations will  be  opportune. 
Large  and  sudden  changes  in  the exchange  rate can  disrupt  trade 
relationships  between  countries  by  altering  competitive conditions  in a 
manner  which  does  not  reflect  changes  in  relative costs, factor  endowment 
and  other "fundamental"  factors.  In  these cases,  there  is a  danger  of 
protectionist pressures,  which  can  trigger a  chain  reaction  limiting  the 
free  flow  of trade,  exacerbating  inflation and  seriously hampering  growth. 
In  such  circumstances,  even  in  the absence of evident  disorderly condi-
tions,  action  designed  to  restrain or  slow  down  movement  of the  rate 
may  be  required. 
However,  dramatic  changes  in  the  exchange  rate can  spotlight, 
often more  sharply and  opportunely  than other  variables, deep  economic 
changes  in the country  concerned  as  compared  with  others.  In certain 
cases  such  exchange  rate movements  will  be  acceptable  because  they  reflect 
explicit  policy choices  (such  as  a  revaluation  for  the currency of a  low 
inflation country).  Nevertheless,  if a  movement  is very  sharp  and  sudden 
•••  I ••• 
(*)  In  theoretical  terms,  the same  point  has  been  made  very  clearly by 
Grossmann  and  Stiglitz  :  "If competitive  equilibrium  is defined as 
a  situation  in  which  prices are  such  that all arbitrage profits are 
eliminated,  is it possible  that  a  competitive  economy  always  be  in 
equilibrium  ?  Clearly not,  for  then  those  who  arbitrage make  no 
(private)  return  from  their  (privately)  costly activity.  Hence  the 
assumptions  that all markets  are always  in  equilibrium and  always 
perfectly arbitraged are  inconsistent  when  arbitrage  is  costly~" 
(Sanford J.  Grossmann  and  Joseph  E.  Stiglitz,  On  the  impossibility 
of  informationally efficient market  :  American  Economic  R~view, 
June  1980,  vol.  70,  N°  3,  pp.  393-408. -18-
it will  generally  be  unwelcome  to  the country  concerned.  In  such  circum-
stances,  intervention aimed  at  damping  the movement  may  be  beneficial, 
although  it should  be  underlined  that  the border  line between  "leaning 
against  the wind"  and  "manipulation"  of  exchange  rates is very  easy  to 
trespass  and  therefore great  care  has  to be  put  in performing  this  kind 
of· intervention. 
Any  action  aimed  directly· at  the exchange  rate will  spill over 
into other  fields,  even  if the authorities  attempt  to offset  its direct 
effects on  internal monetary  conditions.  In  particular,  conflicts may 
arise between  the  exchange  rate objectives and  aggregate-oriented mone-
tary policies or  interest  rate policies.  The  existence of these spill-
over  effects  implies that,  in general,  a  compromise  will  have  to  be  found 
between  exchange  rates and  other objectives of  economic  policy.  It also 
implies  that  policy actions  in other  fields will  influence the exchange 
rate.  As  a  consequence  any  exchange  rate policy has  to  be  seen as ·a 
component  of overall  economic  policy whose  internal  consistency has  to 
be .Preserved. - 19-
10.  CONCLUSIONS 
I  shall try to  summarize  my  remarks  in a  few  points. 
First, the  world  monetary  and  economic  order  that  prevailed  in 
the  first  two  post-war  decades  has  disappeared  in the  seventies.  The  break 
of  the  double,  fixed  lin~between gold  and  the dollar,  and  between  the 
dollar  and  the other  currencie~  the  emergence  of  a  multicurrency  reserve 
system,  the  floating  of  exchange  rates,  the  shift  of  the power  to fix 
energy  prices  from  oil  companies  to  OPEC,  are all  at  the  same  time  manif-
estations  and  causes  of  the  end  of  that  order.  They  are  interrelated 
expressions  of  the  same  historical  developments. 
Second,  that  order  has  not  been  replaced  by  a  new  one.  Inter-
dependence  being  as  close  as  before,  and  probably  closer,  an  organization 
to grant  "peaceful"  economic  and  monetary  relationships  is  as  necessary 
as  it was  under  the old order  provided  by  the  "pax  americana". 
Third,  in  the  existing  world  institutional setting, problems 
stemming  from  interdependence  can  only  be  dealt  with  by  way  of  bi- and 
multilateral  consultations,  in  the  (perhaps  too)  numerous  fora  where 
officials and/or  politicians meet:  OECD,  IMF,  ~  10,  Summits,  etc.  The 
assumption  on  which  such  consultations  are  made  is an  acceptance  of  the 
proposition that  each  member's  policies  have  effects on  th~r partners, 
and  that  it  may  not  always  be  true that  what  is good  for  one  is good 
for  th~ others.  An  implicit or  explicit denial  of  this proposition by 
one  of  the partners is a  dangerous  step,  particularly when  none  of  the 
partners  is sufficiently strong and  well-behaved  to  impose  order  on  the  others. 
Fourth,when  there  are  no  agreed  rules  <Like,  in the past,  fixed 
exchange  rates),  and  severe  stagflation makes  policy  choices politically 
very  hard,  consultations  are  a  difficult  and  fragile  instrument  to deal 
with  interdependence.  In  such  circumstances,  consultations  have  to 
touch  upon  a  wide  range  of  policy objectives,  instruments,  and  techniques. 
Fifth, if asked  to  speak  about  us  policies  in  a  consultation 
round,  I  would  say  that  there  is  little reason  for  a  European  todisagree 
either  with  the  high  priority given  to anti-inflation  policy  in  the 
us,  or  with  the  importance  given  to the  control  of  monetary  aggregates. 
However,  the  choice of  techniques  of  monetary  control  unnecessarily 
increases the  strains  imposed  by  a  tough  monetary  policy both  on  the 
economic  system  and  on  the  external partners.  The  relief  coming  from 
improved  techniques  would,  however,  be  marginal.  On  the other  hand,  an 
approach  to  exchange  rate policy  based  on  a  rule of  no  intervention  is 
hard  to  accept  for  European  countries.  As  the  exchange  rate  involves 
two  currencies,  disagreement  in this area  is particularly undesirable. -20-
Sixth,  and  Last,  the  fact  that  there  may  be  only  Limited  dis-
agreement  on  U.S.  policies  means  that  we  recognize  that  these policies 
are  good  for  the u.s.  It  does  not  mean  that  they  are  good  for  their part-
ners,  or  that  they  do  not  hurt:-For  several  European  countries,  in parti-
cular,  the  Level  of  real  interest  rates necessary to  keep  their  currency 
from  depreciating  to  a  Level  inconsistent  with  economic  fundamentals,  is 
much  higher  than  the  Level  required  for  domestic  reasons. 
Thus,  the  ball  comes  back  into our  court.  What  can  we  Europeans 
do  to get  out  of  this  impasse?  Two  things,  I  would  say:  to  show  that  our 
approach  works  in practice  and  to  be  united.  And,  I  would  add,  these  two 
things  Largely  coincide.  That  opens  up  another  field,  that  I  shall  not 
explore  here.  But,  to  put  in  a  nutshell  what  ought  to  be  said  in  this 
respect,  I  could  find  no  better  words  than  those  used  by  Anthony  Solomon 
Less  than  two  years  ago: 
"If  we  can't  Lead  the  way,  through  meaningful  policy  coordination 
between  the u.s.  and  Western  Europe,  there  is  Little  reason  to 
expect  broader  success.  Understanding  of  each  others perspectives 
is prerequisite to  building  a  stronger  relationship.  We  should 
acknowledge  and  build on  our  mutual  successes.  Close  U.S.-European 
cooperation  dominates  the  post-war  record.  But  there  are  also irrit-
ants  and  sources  of  tension.  The  United  States  continually  hears 
European  calls for  stronger u.s.  Leadership  in  the  economic  area, 
and  specifically  in  the  monetary  area.  Yet  when  the  United  States 
does  attempt  to exercise  Leadership,  there  is frequently  a  notable 
absence  of  European  willingness  to  follow.  This  is not  a  recent 
phenomenon.  It  is  understandable  if there  are  differences of  view 
over  the  substance  of  such  questions.  There  inevitably will  be. 
The  substance  can  be  debated.  But  Europe  itself has  and  should 
acknowledge  a  growing  responsibility to exercise  Leadership,  not 
only  in  the  expression  of  its view,  but  in  contributing  to the 
solution of  common  problems.  The  responsibility  cannot  be  one-
sided,  and  Europe  collectively  has  major  potential  for  Leadership 
of  its own.  What  is not  constructive  is for  Europe  to  cloak  its 
substantive disagreements,  and  avoid  accepting  its own  responsi-
bilities, by  resting  on  accusations  of  failure  of u.s.  will  and 
Leadership.  Much  of  the  problem  may  well  relate to the particular 
phase  of  European  efforts to unify  through  the  Community,  it  is  in 
a  unified  Europe  that  real  and  constructive  Leadership  becomes 
possible.  But  the present  decision-making  processes  make  that  possi-
bility difficult to  realize.  Hopefully,  this problem  will  evaporate 
as  the  unification process  evolves - it  is generally  Least  evident 
in  the  trade  area,  where  the  European  Community  has  formal  competence  -
but  it does  represent  a  real  impediment  to meaningful  policy  co-
ordination  on  a  global  scale." 
Brussels 
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1.  EC  and  Ja~an GOP  1960  1965  1970  1975  1979 
as  X of  US  GOP 
EC-9  54  62  64  90  102 
Japan  n.a.  13  21  33  43 
2.  Relative  shares  in world 
trade  (excl.intra-EC trade) 
EC-9  26  26  24  22  24 
Japan  5  5  8  8  9 
USA  C  1)  15  15  18  15  18 
3.  Oeenness  :  imports  of  goods 
and  services as  X of  GOP 
EC-9  (2)  12  11  11  13  14 
Japan  9  9  12  13 
USA  4  4  5  7  10 
4.  Productivity  (in  ECUt  at 
current prices and  exchange 
rates> 
- GNP  per  capita 
•  Japan  n.a.  ,853  1,937  3,631  6,367 
•  USA  2,_655  3,306  4,685  S,761  7,777 
•  EC-9  1,105  1,627  2,438  4,290  6,735 
- GNP  per  emP.loyed  person 
•  Japan  n.a.  1,631  3,682  7,242  13,119  (3) 
•  USA  6,765  8,332  11,107  13,437  16,330 
•  EC-9  2,528  3,828  5,903  10,717  16,739 
- Compensation  per 
salary earner 
•  Japan  n.a.  n.a.  2,434  5,702  10,172  (S) 
•  USA  4,474  5,351  7,553  8,986  11,095 
•  EC-9  1,640  2,487  3,820  7,427  11,165 
Source:  Eurostat 
ALL  figures  are  rounded. 
( 1)  us  :  Fob  +.10  per  cent 
(2)  Excluding  intra-Community  trade  and  services  (estimated) 
(3)  1978 T
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